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Back to Archives | Back to December 2009 Contents 

Community Policing and CompStat: Merged, or Mutually Exclusive?

By Ken Peak, Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Reno; and Emmanuel P. Barthe, Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Reno

The difference between the almost right word and the right word is really a large matter—“tis the difference between the lightning bug and the lightning.”
—Mark Twain, 1888

“We’re not doing community policing now, we’re doing CompStat.” So said a western police chief recently. “We’re going to do CompStat.” So announced a newly elected midwestern sheriff in recent months. How many other chiefs and sheriffs in the United States now say—or at least think—the same way? This article examines how CompStat and community policing are inclusive and dependent upon each other for policing into today’s society.

Those who are engaged in the daily practice of policing need to recall the policing discipline’s roots and evolution, to understand how the field evolved to where it is today. As Oliver Wendell Holmes noted, “In order to understand what is, we must know what has been, and what it tends to become.” The history overview illustrates how CompStat and community policing are contemporary and inclusive and highlights the need to keep this approach to addressing crime and disorder in its proper conceptual place.

The Political Era

The genesis of policing in the United States was entangled in politics, as politicians in large eastern cities were quick to appreciate the value of local influence over the police. In 1844, the New York legislature passed a law establishing a full-time police force for New York City. But the new police force was unlike anything that had existed in Europe. The New York City version was put under the control of the city government and city politicians. The American plan required that each ward in the city be a separate patrol district, unlike the European model, which divided the districts along the lines of criminal activity. The process for selecting officers was also different. The mayor chose the recruits from a list of names submitted by the aldermen and tax assessors of each ward; the mayor then submitted his choices to the city council for approval. This system gave most of the power over the police to the ward aldermen, who were seldom concerned with selecting the best people for the job. Instead, the system allowed and even encouraged political patronage and rewards for friends.1

To be sure, there were benefits to having local political influence over the police: officers were integrated into neighborhoods, which helped to prevent and contain riots and helped immigrants establish themselves in communities and find jobs. But there were weaknesses as well: the intimacy with the community, the closeness to politicians, and the decentralized organizational structure (and its inability to provide supervision of officers) led to police corruption. The close identification of police with neighborhoods also resulted in discrimination against strangers, especially ethnic and racial minorities. Police officers often ruled their beats with the “end of their nightsticks” and practiced “curbside justice.”2 The lack of organizational control over officers also caused some inefficiencies and disorganization.

Reformers attempted to remove the police from this entrenchment in politics that prevailed from the 1840s to the 1930s. First were attempts to create civil service systems to eliminate patronage and ward influences from the hiring and firing of police officers. Also coming into play were the efforts of August Vollmer, a pioneer of police professionalism who rallied police executives around the idea of reform during the 1920s and 1930s. The belief that police officers should do more than merely arrest offenders, and that they should actively seek to prevent crime by “saving" potential or actual offenders, were important themes in police reform.3

The Professional (or Reform) Era

The scientific theory of administration caught on in America in the early 20th century, and the police were not spared from this emphasis on production and unity of control.4 First came the notion that police officers were best managed by a hierarchical pyramid of control. Police leaders routinized and standardized police work; officers were to enforce laws and make arrests whenever they could. Discretion was limited as much as possible. When special problems arose, special units (such as vice, juvenile, drugs, tactical) were created rather than assigning problems to patrol officers.

Then, came the 1960s, a time of explosion and turbulence. Inner-city residents rioted in several major cities, protestors denounced military involvement in Vietnam, and assassins ended the lives of President John F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. The country was witnessing tremendous upheaval, and incidents like the so-called police riot at the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago raised many questions about the police and their function and role.

The professional era brought several advantages over its political-minded precursor. For example, police chief executives became selected on merit, and patrol officer recruiting, testing, and training improved in many ways. Police salaries, working conditions, and benefits also improved, and women and minorities found a home in the field—as many luminaries such as August Vollmer and national commissions argued what should be done.

But the emphasis of the professional era on quantity cannot be overlooked. Police officers were expected to remain in their “rolling fortresses,” going from one call to the next with all due haste;5 officers were often judged on how many miles they drove, how many tickets they wrote, or how many arrests they made during a tour of duty. The crime rate became the primary indicator of police effectiveness. Citizens’ responsibility in crime control was limited, and police were the “thin blue line.”6

Being a patrol officer often meant acting like a human pinball, reactively going from call to call, getting out of the patrol vehicle upon arrival at the scene, taking a report, and then returning to the patrol car and resuming patrol—to log more miles and look busy and productive. If a citizen were to get any face time with an officer, it was typically as the officer drove by at 35 miles per hour and waved. Officers were expected, to quote police expert Chris Braiden, to “park their brains at the door of the stationhouse, and follow orders like a robot.”7 Many of today’s police executives—particularly those of the baby boomer generation—will well remember the facets of policing that prevailed during the professional era.

Meanwhile, police organizations became law enforcement agencies with the sole goal of controlling crime. Any non-enforcement activities they were required to do were considered social work. Eventually, in some cities, officers were not permitted to live in the same beat they patrolled in order to isolate them as completely as possible from political influences. Police departments became one of the most autonomous agencies in urban government.8 The professional era of policing was now in full bloom. Research was seldom done concerning methods of policing, as the police resisted outside scrutiny.9 But change came anyway. As Herman Goldstein put it, “Crises stimulate progress. The police came under enormous pressure in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as they were confronted with concern about a rapidly rising crime rate, civil rights demonstrations, racial conflicts, riots and political protests of the war in Vietnam.”10

Problems with the professional model of policing began to arise during the late 1960s:

  1. Crime began to rise and research suggested that conventional police methods were not effective. The 1960s were a time of explosion and turbulence, as inner city residents rioted in several major cities, protestors denounced military involvement in Vietnam, the country was witnessing tremendous upheaval, and many questions were raised about the police and their function and role.

  2. Fear rose. People abandoned parks, public transportation, neighborhood shopping centers, churches, and entire neighborhoods. Researchers found that fear was more closely associated with disorder than with crime. Ironically, order maintenance was one of the functions that police had been downplaying over the years.

  3. Many minorities did not perceive their treatment by police as equitable or adequate. They protested not only police mistreatment but also lack of treatment. The legitimacy of police was questioned: Students resisted police; minorities rioted against them for what they represented; and the public, for the first time, questioned police tactics.

  4. Some of the myths on which the professional era was founded could no longer be sustained Over and over, research underscored the use of discretion at all levels of policing and that law enforcement made up but a small portion of police officers’ activities. Other research findings shook the foundations of old assumptions about policing.11

  5. Police began to acquire competition: private security and the community crime control movement. Businesses, industries, and private citizens began turning to private police agencies to protect themselves and their property, reflecting a lack of confidence in public policing.

  6. Changing Wisdom of Policing. Studies of policing revealed an emergence of what Goldstein called a new “common wisdom” of policing.12 As examples, it was learned that two-person patrol vehicles were no safer or more effective than one-person cars; response time had little to do with whether or not an arrest was made at the scene; detectives were greatly overrated in their ability to solve crimes;13 less than 50 percent of an officer's time was committed to calls for service; and of those calls handled, over 80 percent were noncriminal incidents.14 Such findings demonstrated that many sacred cow police methods were erroneous and required a radical change in perceptions of the role of the police.15 Officers who were glued to their police car radios, flitting from call to call as rapidly as possible, were not effective in the long term, and they learned little about the underlying causes of problems in the neighborhoods on their beats.

In summation, the following are some of the factors that set the stage for a departure from the professional era:16

  • The narrowing of the police mission to crime fighting

  • Increased cultural diversity in our society

  • The detachment of patrol officers in patrol vehicles

  • Increased violence in our society

  • A scientific view of management, stressing efficiency more than effectiveness, quantitative policing more than qualitative policing

  • A downturn in the economy and, subsequently, a do-more-with-less philosophy toward the police

  • Increased dependence on high-technology equipment rather than contact with the public

  • The emphasis on organizational change, including decentralization and greater officer discretion

  • Isolation of police administration from community and officer input

  • Concern about police violations of the civil rights of minorities

  • A yearning for personalization of government services

  • Burgeoning attempts by the police to adequately reach the community through crime prevention, team policing, and police-community relations

Most of these elements contain a common theme: the isolation of the police from the public.

The Community Policing Era

In the early 1970s, it was suggested that the performance of patrol officers would improve by redesigning their job based on motivators.17 This suggestion later evolved into a concept known as team policing, which sought to restructure police departments, improve police-community relations, enhance police officer morale, and facilitate change in the police organization. Its primary element was a decentralized neighborhood focus for the delivery of police services. Officers were to be generalists, trained to investigate crimes and basically attend to all of the problems in their area; a team of officers would be assigned to a particular neighborhood and would be responsible for all police services in that area.In the end, however, team policing failed because most of the experiments were poorly planned and hastily implemented, resulting in street officers who did not understand what they were supposed to do.

Meanwhile, during the late 1970s and early 1980s foot patrol became more popular, and many jurisdictions (such as Newark, New Jersey; Boston; and Flint, Michigan) even demanded it. In Newark, an evaluation found that officers on foot patrol produced a significant increase in the level of satisfaction with police service, led to a significant reduction of perceived crime problems, and resulted in a significant increase in the perceived level of neighborhood safety.18

In addition, research conducted during the 1970s suggested that information could help police improve their ability to deal with crime. These studies, along with the aforementioned studies of foot patrol and fear reduction, created new opportunities for police to understand the increasing concerns of citizens’ groups about problems (such as gangs and prostitutes) and to work with citizens to do something about them. Police discovered that when they asked citizens about their priorities, citizens appreciated their asking and often provided useful information.

In the early 1980s, the notion of community policing emerged as the dominant direction for thinking about policing. It was designed to reunite the police with the community. According to Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, “It is a philosophy and not a specific tactic; a proactive, decentralized approach, designed to reduce crime, disorder, and fear of crime, by involving the same officer in the same community for a long-term basis.”19 But no single program describes community policing. It has been applied in various forms by police agencies in the United States and abroad and differs according to community needs, politics, and the resources available.

Under community policing, the priorities and assessment of the police differ from the traditional model. Former New York City Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown summed it up this way:

I believe that community policing—the building of problem-solving partnerships between the police and those they serve—is the future of American law enforcement.… In essence, we are bringing back a modern version of the “cop on the beat.”…We need to solve chronic community problems rather than just react to them.…I view community policing as a better, smarter and more cost-effective way of using police resources.20

Community policing goes beyond simply putting officers on foot and bicycle patrols, or in neighborhood stations. It redefines the role of the officer on the street, from crime fighter to problem solver and neighborhood ombudsman. It forces a cultural transformation of the entire department, including a decentralized organizational structure and changes in recruiting, training, awards systems, evaluation, promotions, and so forth. Furthermore, this philosophy asks officers to break away from the binds of incident-driven policing and to seek proactive and creative resolution to crime and disorder.

Then came writings concerning problem-oriented policing by Herman Goldstein, who first coined the term out of frustration with the dominant model for improving police operations: “More attention [was] being focused on how quickly officers responded to a call than on what they did when they got to their destination.” 21 As a result, Goldstein argued for a radical change in the direction of efforts to improve policing, to help move the police from their past preoccupation with form and process to a much more direct, thoughtful concern with substantive problems. Goldstein made the following argument:

  1. The police must define more clearly and understand more fully the problems they are expected to handle, while recognizing the relationships between and among incidents.

  2. The police must develop a commitment to analyzing problems and gathering information from police files, from the minds of experienced officers, and from other agencies of government.

  3. The police must be encouraged to conduct an uninhibited search for the most effective response to each problem, looking beyond just the criminal justice system to a wide range of alternatives, and try to design a customized response.22

Community-Oriented Policing and Problem Solving

Thus was combined the complementary concepts of community-oriented policing and problem solving (COPPS) that is now the culture of many police organizations. The new police culture culminated in the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which authorized $8.8 billion over six years to create the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) in the U.S. Department of Justice. It also added 100,000 police officers to communities across the country and created 31 regional community-policing institutes.23

Police have changed their methods, their management practices, and even their views of their work. They are reacquainting themselves with members of the community by involving citizens in the resolution of neighborhood problems—viewing the public as a part of as opposed to apart from their efforts.

Crime control remains an important function, but equal emphasis is given to prevention. Police officers return to their wide use of discretion under this model, with decision making being pushed down to the lower levels of the organization. Participative management is thus greatly increased, and fewer levels of authority are required to administer the organization; middle-management layers are reduced.

Included in COPPS is a four-stage problem-solving process that is known as SARA, for scanning, analysis, response, and assessment.24

  1. Scanning: Problem Identification. Scanning is conducting a preliminary inquiry to determine whether a problem really exists; officers should first identify problems on their beats and look for a pattern or persistent, repeat incidents.

  2. Analysis: The Heart of Problem Solving. Analysis is the heart of the problem-solving process. Effective, tailor-made responses cannot be developed unless people know what is causing the problem. Thus, the purpose of analysis is to learn as much as possible about problems in order to identify their causes; officers must gather information about the scope, nature, and causes of problems. An available tool for the problem-solving officers is the problem analysis triangle, which assumes that three elements are needed for a problem to occur: an offender, a victim, and a location. This triangle helps officers visualize the problem and understand the relationship between the three elements.25 Certainly, CompStat is a valuable part of this analysis phase.

  3. Response: Formulation of Tailor-Made Strategies. After a problem has been clearly defined and analyzed, the officer searches for and focuses on developing and implementing, responses to the problem; he or she reviews the findings concerning the three sides of the crime triangle and develops creative solutions that will address at least two sides of the triangle.

  4. Assessment: Evaluation of Overall Effectiveness. Here, officers evaluate the effectiveness of their responses, which might include numbers of arrests, levels of reported crime, response times, clearance rates, citizen complaints, and various workload indicators, such as calls for service and the number of field interviews conducted.

The problem-oriented approach to policing was tested in Madison, Wisconsin; Baltimore County, Maryland; and Newport News, Virginia. Studies there found that police officers had the capacity to do problem solving successfully and could work well with citizens and other agencies. Also, citizens seemed to appreciate working with police. Moreover, this approach gave officers more autonomy to analyze the underlying causes of problems and to find creative solutions.

COPPS has now moved through three generations, according to Willard Oliver.26The first generation, innovation, spanned the period from 1979 through 1986 and began with the work of Herman Goldstein concerning needed improvement of policing;27 it included the broken windows theory of James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling.28 Early trials of community policing during this period—called “experiments,” “test sites,” and “demonstration projects”—were usually restricted to larger metropolitan cities. The style of policing that was employed was predominantly narrow in focus, such as foot patrols, problem-solving methods, or community substations.

In its second generation—diffusion, from 1987 through 1994—the COPPS philosophy and practice spread rapidly among police agencies through various forms of communication in the police subculture. In 1985, slightly more than 300 police agencies employed some form of community policing,29 and by 1994 it had spread to more than 8,000 agencies.30 The practice of community policing during this generation was still generally limited to large and midsize cities, and the strategies normally targeted drugs and fear-of-crime issues while improving police-community relations. Much more emphasis was placed on evaluating outcomes through the use of appropriate research methodologies.

The third generation, institutionalization, began in 1995 and continues to the present. Nearly seven in ten (68 percent) of the nation’s 17,000 local police agencies, employing 90 percent of all officers, have adopted COPPS.31

Today COPPS has extended its reach to all manner of problems, even involving crime mapping and crime prevention measures such as situational crime prevention and crime prevention through environmental design. However, what was needed was a policing strategy that not only reflected police adherence to the community model and the problem solving policing philosophy, but also provided direction for the best deployment of scarce resources as well as measuring police performance; that strategy has arrived, and has begun to sweep the nation; it is termed “CompStat.”


The adoption of the SARA model required law enforcement agencies to invest in new data collection tools and to explore the benefits of data driven operations. This is especially true for the analysis portion of the SARA model, described above, where crime problems are dissected and analyzed using multiple sources of information in the hopes of better understanding its origins and impact on the community.

As indicated above, CompStat is a relatively new crime management tool used in the problem-solving process; it is a “strategic control system designed for the collection and feedback of information on crime and related quality-of-life issues.”32 This “emerging police managerial paradigm” is said to be “revolutionizing law enforcement management and practice.”33 and “perhaps the single most important organizational [and] administrative innovation in policing during the latter half of the 20th century.” CompStat has also been summarized as follows: “Collect, analyze, and map crime data and other essential police performance measures on a regular basis, and hold police managers accountable for their performance as measured by these data.”34

Since CompStat was introduced by the New York City Police Department in 1994, it has been widely adopted; indeed, by 2005 a national survey found that 58 percent of large agencies (those with 100 or more sworn officers) had either adopted or were planning to implement a CompStat-like program.35

The key elements of CompStat are as follows:

  • Specific objectives

  • Accurate and timely intelligence

  • Effective tactics

  • Rapid deployment of personnel and resources

  • Relentless follow-up and assessment36

CompStat pushes all precincts to generate weekly crime activity reports so that they can be held accountable for the achievement of several objectives. Crime data are readily available, offering up-to-date information that is then compared at citywide, patrol, and precinct levels. Instead of simply responding to crime, commanders begin thinking proactively about ways to deal with it in terms of suppression, intervention, and prevention; commanders also must explain what tactics they have employed to address crime patterns, what resources they have and need, and with whom they have collaborated.37

Over time, CompStat has evolved to include other data: census demographics, arrest and summons activity, average response time, domestic violence incidents, unfounded radio runs, personnel absences, and even citizen complaints and charges of officer misconduct. Many scholars and practitioners believe that CompStat has played a prominent role in the significant crime reductions seen across the nation in recent years.

Certainly the impact CompStat has had on police management practices cannot be denied, while another benefit has been the significant increases in job satisfaction found by those who feel empowered by the aforementioned problem solving process.38

Using CompStat Data: Some Practical Applications

Next is an overview of the three steps for presenting, comparing, and mapping data using CompStat.39

The first step involves descriptive statistics, or presenting the data so that everyone, from commanders down to patrol officers, can readily understand the relevant information. Data may be presented and described in a number of ways: aggregate increase or decrease; simple percentages (including increase or decrease over previous time frames); ratio and rates; incidents compared to population; mean, median, and mode; pie charts, line charts, bar charts, histograms; and so on.

The second step in presenting data, comparing, is designed to reveal the relationship between two or more crimes. These statistics are called measures of association, and they enable crime analysts to quantify the strength and direction of a relationship—to uncover the connections between crimes, and to make predictions. For example, suppose a crime analyst was interested in seeing if relationship existed between calls for service (CFS) pertaining to drug sales and shootings. After gathering the appropriate data, by calculating the measure of association (such as a Pearson’s r), the analyst can determine the strength of the relationship and its direction. Also assume that a strong, positive relationship was found between these two variables (that is, the two crimes of drug sales and shootings); one might infer that the two crimes were closely related and, as one of the crimes increased, so would the other. A prediction could then be made that as there are more CFS for drug sales, the higher the number of shootings that might be expected as well. The analyst would do well to remember, however, that this strong positive relationship does not automatically prove such a connection exists, but this association would serve as an important clue about causation. Comparing the data allows analysts and commanders to consider adjusting or compensating for shifts in trends or patterns. Appropriate charts should display the information for each beat, zone, or precinct, as well as city- or county-wide area, including the aggregate difference and percentage change in reported incidents. The data should also be depicted in temporal (time) distribution, so that commanders can see when crimes occur.

The final step, crime mapping, focuses more on the spatial analysis of crime. For example, analysts can create overlays of CFS versus arrests locations, unsolved burglaries with known burglars’ residences, or CFS with abandoned buildings. More advanced mapping techniques can also help determine the paths or nodes used when criminals travel. Analysis can create specialty maps, such as locating sex offenders’ residences, recovered guns, recovered stolen autos, and thefts of auto parts. Most important, they can display data to show hot spots, or areas of concentrated crime (discussed more fully below); the police can then develop appropriate intervention strategies.

Only Doing CompStat?

As asserted, considering that CompStat is now being employed to replace community policing and problem solving for addressing crime and disorder—aside from the fact that few members of the general public even understand what the term means—such exclusionary use does not recognize the larger view. Community policing and CompStat are inclusive:

  • CompStat is but a component (albeit a major one) of the very critical analysis phase of the SARA problem-solving process.

  • CompStat’s quantitative approach to fighting crime and disorder, if not woven into the much larger, four-step SARA problem-solving process under COPPS, would be regressive by returning policing to the professional era and its obsession with all things that can be measured quantitatively.

  • Policing has traversed three generations and is now firmly entrenched in the community-policing era.

  • It perpetuates the long-standing, stinging indictment by critics of U.S. police leadership that they continually seek the next flavor-of-the-month approach to crime fighting.

As Mark Twain indicated in the opening quote,40 we must remember that language is a very powerful tool—and potential weapon. And nowhere is language more critical than in policing. Given its history, policing can ill afford to give the public the impression that it is still groping about for ways to protect the public, even if only in terms of its choice and use of language. ■


1David R. Johnson, American Law Enforcement: A History (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1981), 26–27.
2George L. Kelling, “Juveniles and Police: The End of the Nightstick,” in From Children to Citizens, Vol. 2 of The Role of the Juvenile Court, ed. Francis X. Hartmann (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1987).
3Herman Goldstein, Policing a Free Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977).
4Kenneth J. Peak, Justice Administration: Police, Courts, and Corrections Management, 6th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2010), 23.
5Peter K. Manning, “The Police: Mandate, Strategies, and Appearances,” in, Crime and Justice in American Society, ed. Jack D. Douglas (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 149-163.
6Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform: The Emergence of Professionalism (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977).
7Chris Braiden, “What Community Policing Is Supposed to Be, But Isn’t,” POP Conference, San Jose, California, March 12, 1993.
8Goldstein, Policing a Free Society, 135-136
9Peter K. Manning, “The Researcher: An Alien in the Police World,” in The Ambivalent Force: Perspectives on the Police, 2d ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1976), 103–121.
10Herman Goldstein, Problem Oriented Policing (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 9.
11Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley, The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities (New York: The Free Press, 1986).
12Goldstein, Problem-Oriented Policing, 10–13.
13Kenneth J. Peak and Ronald W. Glensor, Community Policing and Problem Solving: Strategies and Practices, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2008), 15–24.
14Elaine Cumming, Ian Cumming, and Laura Edell, “Policeman as Philosopher, Guide, and Friend,” Social Problems 12 (1965): 285; Thomas E. Bercal, “Calls for Police Assistance,” American Behavioral Scientist 13 (1970): 682; and Albert J. Reiss Jr., The Police and the Public (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971).
15Goldstein, Problem Oriented Policing, 11.
16Peak and Glensor, Community Policing and Problem Solving, 23–24.
17Thomas J. Baker, “Designing the Job to Motivate,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 45 (1976): 3–7.
18The Police Foundation, The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment (Washington, D.C.: 1981).
19Robert Trojanowicz and Bonnie Bucqueroux, Community Policing: A Contemporary Perspective (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1990), 154.
20Lee P. Brown, “Community Policing: Its Time Has Come,” The Police Chief 62 (September 1991): 6.
21Herman Goldstein, “Problem-Oriented Policing,” paper presented at the National Institute of Justice Conference on Policing: State of the Art III, Phoenix, Arizona, June 12, 1987.
22Ibid., 5–6.
23Peak and Glensor, Community Policing and Problem Solving, 25.
24Goldstein, “Problem-Oriented Policing,” 43–52.
25John Eck, A Dissertation Prospectus for the Study of Characteristics of Drug Dealing Places (dissertation, University of Maryland-College Park, 1992).
26Willard M. Oliver, “The Third Generation of Community Policing: Moving through Innovation, Diffusion, and Institutionalization,” Police Quarterly 3 (December 2000): 367–388.
27See Goldstein, Policing a Free Society, generally.
28James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,” Atlantic Monthly (March 1982): 29–38.
29Samuel Walker, The Police in America: An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).
30Tom McEwen, National Assessment Program: 1994 Survey Results (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1995).
31U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Law Enforcement Management andAdministrative Statistics: Local Police Departments 2000 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003), iii.
32David Weisburd, Stephen Mastrofski, Ann Marie McNally, Roseanne Greenspan, and James Willis, “Reforming to Preserve: CompStat and Strategic Problem Solving in American Policing,” Criminology and Public Policy 2, no. 3 (July 2003): 421-456.
33Daniel DeLorenzi, Jon M. Shane, and Karen L. Amendola, “The CompStat Process: Managing Performance on the Pathway to Leadership,” The Police Chief 73 (September 2006): 34.
35Heath B. Grant and Karen J. Terry, Law Enforcement in the 21st Century (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2005), 329–330.
39Jon M. Shane, “CompStat Design,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (May 2004):17–18., “Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations, No. 540,” (accessed October 1, 2008).



From The Police Chief, vol. LXXVI, no. 12, December 2009. Copyright held by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 515 North Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 USA.

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