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Back to Archives | Back to February 2006 Contents 

Operation LEAD: New Jersey's Statewide Response to Louisiana in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina

By Rick Fuentes, Colonel and Superin­tendent, New Jersey State Police, and Director , New Jersey Office of Emer­gency Management; and John Hunt, Major , New Jersey State Police, and Deputy Director , New Jersey Office of Emergency Management


Eye of Hurricane
Quick Facts

n October 11, 2005, the final platoons of personnel, vehicles, and equipment as­signed to the Louisiana Emergency Assis­tance Deployment (Operation LEAD), returned to New Jersey.

Operating through the New Jersey Office of Emergency Management1, Opera­tion LEAD had effectively completed its primary mission to assist the New Orleans Police Department and Louisiana State Po­lice in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by way of staffing, equipment, and logisti­cal and technical assets. These assets were deployed with a systematic approach grounded in complete self-sufficiency.

Over the course of five weeks, more than 600 state troopers and local and county police officers from 112 New Jersey law enforcement agencies, accompanied by fire service, emergency medical technicians, and a mobile relief team from the Salvation Army, carried out day and night patrol operations in the Second, Third, and Sixth Police Districts in New Orleans. The Second District alone encompassed approximately 9.7 square miles, with a pre-evacuation population of 100,000. All three districts were heavily damaged by floods and high winds.

Among their many activities, Opera-tion LEAD personnel searched 7,989 residences, rescued 67 stranded residents, and assisted 174 residents who were shel-tered in place. They assisted in the recovery of 117 bodies, rescued 274 animals, and carried out 2,050 humanitarian deliveries of food and water to those residents who chose to remain in their homes. There were more than 4,300 decontaminations of emergency workers and vehicles. Patrols handled more than 4,400 telephone calls to 911 operators.

STATEWIDE COLLABORATION AND COORDINATED RESPONSE
The core values of service to others and personal sacrifice are deeply woven into the fabric of the law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical communities. They are a powerful inertia that brings about an overwhelming personal and organizational need to respond when others are in need. In times of crisis, however, spontaneous or unsolicited individual or agency responses can risk being at odds with their good intentions. Emergency response
should not add another layer to the chaos and disorder of a major disaster, particularly when locally affected police and fire departments are coming to grips with their own losses or personnel dislocations in the midst of organizing a rescue and recovery effort.

After the September 11, 2001, terror attack in New York City, responders labor­ing at Ground Zero quickly became ex­hausted, hungry, and dehydrated, and they desperately needed billeting, food, and water. After a long day of passing buckets of debris and searching for sur­vivors and human remains in the rubble pile, there arose a need for on-site medical treatment and stress counseling.

Rescue workers also labored against a backdrop of short- and long-term liability issues involving possible physical or psy­chological injury or death while render­ing assistance. Reducing liabilities and as­serting protections were among the many issues that weighed heavily on the minds of New Jersey State Police emergency management commanders as they set out to develop an organized and orderly de­ployment to Louisiana. Existing New Jer­sey emergency operations plans govern­ing local and state responses to hurricanes and floods proved helpful but did not an­ticipate the need for lengthy supply lines. If Operation LEAD was to stand on its own two feet, it must sustain revolving 14-day deployments that included equip­ment, personnel, food, sanitation, com­munications and other logistics along a supply route more than 1,300 miles long.

When the devastation from Hurricane Katrina was followed by the structural failure of several levees in New Orleans, the police, fire, and emergency medical agencies in New Jersey stood ready to re­spond with all urgency. Under the author­ity of state director, the office of the super­intendent issued a statewide message that informed local and county law enforce­ment agencies that plans were already under way to coordinate a multiagency statewide response through the New Jer­sey Office of Emergency Management (NJOEM). All outside agency deploy­ments were being coordinated through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).

EMAC is the nation's interstate mutual aid agreement during times of crisis. For Operation LEAD, EMAC provided the legal foundation for a statewide response from New Jersey that would cover federal reimbursement for services rendered and granted Louisiana law en­forcement powers in support of a police mission on the ground.

To weave a New Jersey multiagency response into a single deployment to Louisiana, New Jersey Acting Governor Richard Codey signed an executive order appointing all responding police officers, fire service, and emergency medical per­sonnel as state emergency workers under the command and control of the NJOEM. By this designation, all personnel as­signed as emergency workers to Opera­tion LEAD were considered to be agents of Louisiana under EMAC for tort liability and immunity purposes.

As discussions continued with Louisiana EMAC and FEMA officials, senior emergency management comman­ders at New Jersey State Police headquar­ters completed a concept of operations for a stand-alone deployment to Louisiana. This operational plan would tap into col­laborative homeland security initiatives already established in New Jersey.

The unending fear of terrorism in the greater New York and New Jersey metro­politan area had driven most of the feder­al homeland security funding in New Jersey into increasing preparedness through training and tabletop exercises, disbursing or upgrading first responder and decontamination equipment, and achieving radio interoperability. From an all-hazards perspective, significant im­provements were observed in responses to a whole gamut of technological and naturally occurring calamities, including fires, floods, collapsed buildings, and chemical spills or leaks.

Millions of dollars earmarked for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) in northeastern New Jersey had also provid­ed training and equipment to more than 800 police officers in six counties, mobiliz­ing them into county-based rapid deploy­ment teams (RDT). In the event of a state emergency declaration by the Governor, the RDTs could transition into a larger force under the command and control of the state director of OEM.

New decontamination equipment and training had been provided to New Jersey police and fire departments, particularly to those located in the UASI region. This had brought about the creation of the De­contamination Task Force in four counties, staffed by police and fire personnel trained to decontaminate, or hot wash, emergency workers and equipment oper­ating in a toxic environment.

The New Jersey State Police, in cooper­ation with the county prosecutors, had also brokered agreements to create other specialized coalitions of federal, state, city, and county bomb squads, SWAT teams, canine units, and crime scene investiga­tion units to respond to mass casualty events. One or more of these task forces could be deployed on the basis of their technical expertise. Positioned to protect New Jersey against the threat of terrorism and an array of natural and technological disasters, these collaborations offered a highly qualified pool of responders for Operation LEAD.

Rescue team members evacuate an elderly resident
The first EMAC request from Louisiana arrived on August 3, 2005, and brought about the deployment of four swift-water rescue teams involving 16 of­ficers from the state's 210-strong Urban Search and Rescue Task Force One, as well as a seven-member water rescue unit Swift-water rescue team members evacuate an elderly resident from a flooded parish. Photograph courtesy New Jersey State Police from the Passaic County Sheriff's Depart­ment. They carried full camp provisions, tents, cots, and enough food and water to last for 72 hours. Arriving in New Orleans on September 5, they began water rescues at the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency Incident Support Team (FEMA/IST). In their two weeks of operation, swift-water rescue team mem­bers searched 2,300 residences and struc­tures, rescued 29 residents, sheltered 54 in their residences, and marked three bodies for recovery.

Once the U.S. Army Corps of Engi­neers had shored up the levees and put several huge pumps into service, the re­ceding city waters increased the capacity for ground operations. EMAC requests for out-of-state rescue, recovery, and gen­eral police services in support of those ground operations became a priority.

Captain Karl Kleeberg, supervisor of the New Jersey State Police Emergency Management Recovery Bureau, had been deployed along with Task Force One. His mission was to develop an operational plan in conjunction with the Louisiana State Po­lice and New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) that would map out a police mis­sion for a larger ground force of New Jersey law enforcement responders. As a force multiplier to the NOPD, it was agreed that Operation LEAD would assist in search, recovery, and general police patrol opera­tions in the Second Police District in New Orleans.

To reduce the burden upon fatigued local departments, Operation LEAD would have to be self-sufficient in its day-to-day operations, identifying its own means of housing, sanitation, and food provisions. Although rescue and recovery operations would take place in devastat­ed areas without essential services, every effort was made to locate the command post and billeting facilities on high ground with power and utilities near the patrol area.

The search focused on the New Or­leans suburbs of Kenner and Harahan. The command post was located at the Vet­erans of Foreign Wars (VFW) post in Harahan. Billeting and dining facilities were located in a gymnasium at the Muss Bertolino Athletic Complex in Kenner. The decision to locate these facilities sev­eral miles apart was deliberate, creating two distinctly different environments for work and recreation.

STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE
Perhaps the greatest challenge of Op­eration LEAD was to simultaneously transport all of the personnel and equip­ment necessary to create a self-contained community of New Jersey emergency workers in greater New Orleans. Once this force arrived in Louisiana, command and control shifted to lines of authority di­viding mission-oriented specialties and technical expertise.

The Operation LEAD task force was organized according to the Incident Command System principles, with sections es­tablished for command, operations, logis­tics, finance, and planning. Each section had its own section chief and staff.

Command: The command staff was composed of state police personnel, with a major or a captain from the emergency management section serving as an inci­dent commander.2 A support staff includ­ed a deputy incident commander, an op­erations officer, a small investigative squad of detectives from major crimes, street gang, and crime scene units, and a rapid response team of approximately 10 troopers to support patrol operations with heavy weaponry, antisniper tactics, and force protection. A public information officer was assigned to handle all media inquiries and the visits of dignitaries and news reporters.

Operations Section: The operations section consisted of five teams of 20-25 of­ficers and firefighters under the immedi­ate command of local and county police captains and lieutenants to conduct search, rescue, and recovery operations. To the extent possible, these teams consol­idated officers from the same or neighbor­ing departments in New Jersey to foster the closest possible working relationship. In addition, each team contained fire ser­vice personnel responsible for decontami­nation after every patrol.

A hazardous materials team was des­ignated to handle tactical encounters with dangerous chemicals or toxins. This team spent a great deal of time working in part­nership with the 91st U.S. Army Civil Support Team, stabilizing operations at chemical and industrial facilities through­out Jefferson Parish. Jefferson Parish, home to approximately 500 chemical and industrial facilities, was the hardest hit after storm surge waters in the Industrial Canal collapsed the levee, releasing into the parish a 30-foot-high wall of water and a huge overturned barge that crushed everything in its path.

Essex County firefighters decontaminate the boots
Finance Section: Due to the require­ments of EMAC, the finance section kept strict accounting of all expenditures and captured all costs relating to the deploy­ment. A daily report was provided to the incident commander memorializing all expenses to date and the administrative needs of the detail; current estimates re­veal the total cost for the deployment at approximately 6-8 million dollars. Each member of Operation LEAD was re­quired to fill out a daily activity patrol log and record all shift activities.

Planning Section: The planning sec­tion served as a repository and inventory for all documentation. The section includ­ed the New Jersey Critical Incident Stress Team (CIST), a highly trained group of counselors, to include a state police chap­lain, who were available at all hours to provide crucial stress management coun­seling and nondenominational religious services. The CIST established its reputa­tion at Ground Zero in New York City, de­ploying alongside the New Jersey Urban Search and Rescue Team.

Logistics Section: The logistics section handled radio and telecommunications, medical services, base security, and other technical services. A medical doctor was also present throughout Operation LEAD. A tent in the billeting area was out­fitted as a treatment facility with sufficient privacy to conduct medical examinations. Due to the toxicity of the patrol environment, even a small cut or an abrasion was given quick attention and treatment.

All of these sections provided daily progress reports to the incident comman­der. An incident action plan (IAP) was completed by the planning section chief with tactical input from the other section chiefs. The IAP delineated the mission, goals, and overall strategy for each opera­tional period. It also provided to the inci­dent commander with talking points for the twice-daily roll calls and issued threat assessments and crime intelligence. The IAP was also transmitted electronically to the NJSP command staff in New Jersey and to the Louisiana State Police Com­mand Post in Baton Rouge.

THE LONG SUPPLY LINE
On September 7, the first in a series of three two-week deployments departed from state police Troop C headquarters in central New Jersey.3 The caravan com­prised 74 marked patrol units, 10 hazmat and decontamination vehicles, two ambu­lances, a transportation maintenance ve­hicle, four light towers, and a command post bus. Seven car carriers transported the marked units, leaving a few to escort the convoy. Two low-boy trailers carried the command post bus, two ambulances, and the light towers. Another truck car­ried supplies donated by private compa­nies in Bergen County.

Four New Jersey Transit buses trans­ported 220 troopers, police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical per­sonnel from 35 agencies. The first deploy­ment included five decontamination units from three counties consisting of 36 police officers and firefighters with a specialty in hazardous materials. All Operation LEAD personnel were required to receive inoculations for tetanus, diphtheria, and hepatitis prior to their departure.4

BILLETING AND DINING
Due to the size of the first convoy, the trip took 38 hours. The convoy arrived at the Muss Bertolino Athletic Center in Kenner, a facility with much-needed air conditioning. In advance of their arrival, the New Jersey National Guard, under the command of Major General Glenn Rieth, had flown cots, tents, water, meal rations, and a small contingent of Nation­al Guard and state police personnel, to in­clude Major John Hunt as the designated incident commander, into the New Or­leans Naval Air Station. National Guard soldiers transported the supplies to Ken­ner and then worked nonstop to trans­form the athletic center gymnasium into a fully functioning living quarters for sever­al hundred emergency responders. It was quickly dubbed Camp New Jersey.

The gymnasium was kept cool, in low light, and quiet. Dozens of emergency workers were sleeping or relaxing at all hours of the day or night before their pa­trol shift. To permit recreation and group conversation, outside tents were set up, one of which offered cable television fea­turing baseball games and movies. Through a wireless bridge negotiated with a local company, an Internet kiosk was set up along the interior perimeter of the billeting area so personnel could stay in touch with their departments and fami­lies through e-mail or instant messages. Hot and cold meal choices were offered three times a day in a high school cafeteria near the gymnasium. Snacks, power bars, water, and soft drinks were available 24 hours a day in the billeting area.

SWAT team before a night operation

COMMUNICATIONS AND RADIO INTEROPERABILITY
The first step in ensuring the safety of Operation LEAD personnel was estab­lishing sound and secure communica­tions. NJSP radio technicians and infor­mation technology specialists assessed the communications needs and chal­lenges faced by agencies already responding to the Katrina disaster. The existing state, parish, and local police agencies operated on 800-megahertz sys­tems that were in various stages of opera­tion due to power failures and severe wind damage. The International Tactical (ITAC) interoperability frequencies were being used mostly for point-to-point communications but were hampered by constant chatter.

Technicians believed that NJSP radios could provide some interoperability through these channels. A search began for FCC licenses that would identify what conventional frequencies already pro­grammed into the NJSP radios could be used in the New Orleans area without in­terference. Technicians requested and received a temporary FCC license to oper­ate on the 800-megahertz repeater fre­quencies. This would inform responding agencies that the fr equency was already in use and would avoid interfer­ence with agencies that attempted to use the same or adjacent frequencies. The repeater and talk-around frequencies used by the New Jersey contingency were also coordinated and approved through the FEMA ad hoc frequency coordinator.

A multidisciplinary group of techni­cians arriving in the first wave of the LEAD Task Force quickly went to work to provide radio, telephone, and informa­tion technology support to the command post, billeting, and operational areas. Within the first 24 hours of their arrival, a cache of portable, mobile, and desktop ra­dios, a portable 800-megahertz repeater, and a Raytheon/JPS ACU-1000 Interoper­ability Communications System had been installed. Additionally, a telephone system, wireless and satellite phones, a credentialing machine, a dozen laptop computers with wireless access, and a local area network (LAN) were set up.

Generators and uninterruptible power systems (UPS) were available to provide pri­mary and back up power and an 800-mega-hertz repeater was installed on the 210-foot Bell South building in downtown New Or­leans. This service delivered full local techni­cal support to the operation and set the stage for additional connectivity.5

An initial exchange of radios was con­ducted with the Louisiana State Police and the police departments in New Or­leans, Kenner, Harahan, and Jefferson Parish. Temporary connectivity and monitoring was facilitated through radio reprogramming in the Raytheon Interop­erability System. All of this interagency coordination, carried out under very chal­lenging conditions, permitted the smooth transfer of vital communications and in­formation through dispatch and en­hanced joint operations between Opera­tion LEAD, the U.S. Army, the National Guard, the FBI, the NOPD, and the LSP.

Building upon Internet connectivity, an encrypted VPN tunnel was established between the Harahan command post and NJSP division headquarters in New Jer­sey. This secured the data communica­tions and allowed the Operation LEAD incident commander to exchange com­munications, documents, and large media transfers of photographs with the NJSP command staff.

PATROL OPERATIONS
The primary mission of Operation LEAD was dedicated to search and res­cue. More than 100,000 heavily damaged and flooded residences and commercial buildings in New Orleans and the sur­rounding parishes needed to be searched for survivors or to recover the remains of those who had perished. It was a grueling daytime operation that tested the strength and character of each and every member of Operation LEAD. For much of the five-week deployment, temperatures fluctuat­ed between 90 and 100 degrees, with high humidity and saturated ground condi­tions. As highly toxic groundwater evapo­rated, it left a sickening gray pallor over the entire landscape, producing the per­fect medium for the growth of bacteria and mold.

When the levees collapsed, rapidly churning currents of water filled the in­side of houses in a matter of minutes, up­ending furniture and appliances, and bat­tering residents who could not escape. As the water drained away, everything was deposited in massive piles of debris. Dead bodies filled small spaces between refrig­erators and furniture items and were not easily recognizable. Looking up, rescuers began to recognize large, circular yellow­ish stains on the ceiling as telltale evi­dence of a decomposing body on an up­stairs floor.

Telephone calls from concerned rela­tives often led a team back to a house al­ready searched and a body was recov­ered. In one case, Operation LEAD personnel searched a residence in the 2 District several times as the waters drained and debris was removed, ulti­mately locating three bodies.

Rescuers were not authorized to remove bodies. They marked their exact location with a handheld global position­ing instrument and transmitted the coor­dinates to the Louisiana State Police com­mand post in Baton Rouge. Federal disaster mortuary response teams (DMORT) removed the bodies.

Operation LEAD teams followed a simple process created by FEMA to de­note residences that had already been searched. A team member identified as a doorman spray-painted a large X in bright orange on an outside wall near the front door, adding important pieces of in­formation to brief other teams about the search. Above the X the doorman wrote the date and time of the search. To the left of the X he identified the search team by its initials. For instance, NJLETF stood for the New Jersey Law Enforcement Task Force. To the right of the X the doorman identified any hazards to entry, such as dogs, cats, or snakes. Below the X he records the number of dead bodies found.

During searches, mold and other household contaminants were a constant peril to search personnel. Floors were slip­pery from growths of mold that spread up the walls and across the ceiling. Inhala­tion of aerobic mold spores presented a serious hazard to health. To avoid conta­mination, essential equipment included face masks and Tyvek suits and boots, all of which were discarded after each search. Piles of suits left outside a proper­ty reminded other teams and agencies that the residence had been searched.

Patrol officers searching residences were encouraged to wash their hands dozens of times a day with an alcohol-based hand rub to ward off the possibility of skin infection and disease transmission. Boots and vehicle tires and quarter panels were soaked in detergent and rigorously scrubbed so that mold, bacteria and pollu­tants did not track back into the command post or billeting area.

Oppressive heat quickly increased body temperatures. Patrol supervisors paid close attention to signs of dehydra­tion and heat exhaustion. Heavy sweating was normal. Those who were not sweat­ing were in immediate need of hydration and were taken off the detail.

Patrols at night were conducted in areas of complete darkness, and under conditions far too hazardous to conduct residential searches. Night missions were confined to general police patrol to pre­vent looting and other criminal activity. On occasion, night patrols were support­ed by members of the Oklahoma Air Na­tional Guard who flew helicopters mis­sions with searchlights and forward looking infrared radar (FLIR) in support of the patrols.

Once the parish roadways were cleared of debris and low hanging wires, the command post bus pushed forward with all patrol operations. The bus was equipped with multiple radios, comput­ers, a wireless phone system, a satellite telephone, and had backup generator ca­pacity to operate in a barren communica­tions environment.

A member of NJ Task Force One conducts force protection

FORCE PROTECTION AND CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE
One of the critical issues confronting the conduct of Operation LEAD was the protection of its personnel. Soon after the hurricane had passed, there were reports of looting and weapons thefts by street gangs. Houses were burglarized and burned. Loose bands of armed individu­als were openly engaging police and fire­fighters in head-on skirmishes and snip­ing at helicopters in the midst of their rescue efforts.

These threats underscored the need for force protection during every rescue and re­covery operation. Earlier in the deployment, swift-water rescue teams had added a two-person vessel to every waterborne patrol and armed them with shotguns and other tactical weapons. This patrol vessel cruised the area around the rescue operation, scan­ning the landscape for looters and snipers.

When the city had drained enough to conduct ground operations, heavily armed officers assigned to the rapid de­ployment team secured blocks and neigh­borhoods where search operations were under way. Operation LEAD also provid­ed force protection to local ambulance and other emergency medical responders, as well as to members of the New Orleans and New York City fire departments who continually battled arson fires.

Rescue of abandoned pets
Each of the three Operation LEAD de­ployments included detectives from the New Jersey State Police Street Gang Bureau. Their job was to work with the New Orleans Police Department, the Louisiana State Police, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga­tion to develop intelligence on the presence of street gangs and other organized criminal groups that might pose a threat to the patrol operations. These detectives were a critical part of the morning and evening intelligence briefings to squad leaders.

A final but critical element of force pro­tection is force health protection. Health and safety is an issue whose importance amounts to an ethical imperative, to say nothing of attendant legal obligations. There is a responsibility to communicate risk to those we place in harm's way, vol­untarily or otherwise, and to ensure that their health is monitored before, during, and after deployment to any affected area.

Because a police, fire, or EMS comman­der will likely have health resources avail­able to them (in their jurisdiction, if not in their department), they need not possess the expertise themselves. They simply need solid advisors to help them evaluate three fundamental questions: Are my per­sonnel being thoroughly screened prior to deployment? What is being done to protect them during deployment (by means, for instance, of decontamination, personal protection equipment, and contaminant sampling)? And are they being thoroughly screened at the conclusion of and beyond the deployment? Bottom line: out in front is where an organization wants to be on health issues.

ANIMAL RESCUES
Tens of thousands of house pets, mostly cats and dogs, were abandoned in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. In their haste to evacuate the path of the hurricane, many homeowners had leashed them to furniture and heavy ap­pliances in the mistaken belief that the owners would return after the hurricane passed. Some residents openly defied the mandatory evacuation order and refused to leave their pets, sometimes causing rescue personnel and police to commit desperate acts that resulted in the forced separation or destruction of pets to effect lifesaving rescues.

There was little food to forage that the floodwaters and oppressive heat had not destroyed. Loose pets were poisoned by standing pools of putrid water as the city drained. Those trapped in houses were in ragged condition and wasting away. Many drowned when they could not escape the rising water, while others managed to climb onto cars and rooftops, where they re­mained stranded for days.

Operation LEAD personnel encoun­tered loose house pets everywhere during their patrols. Some followed the uniform foot patrols at a distance but shied away from an extended hand or a calm voice. Lit­tle else could be done for the animals roam­ing the streets of the deserted parishes other than to lay open a bag of dog food alongside containers filled with bottled water.

Pets stranded in houses were not re­moved. The patrols noted their presence by marking the entrance to the houses. News about abandoned pets were passed along to the Louisiana State Police command post in Baton Rouge, with a request for the ASPCA or other animal rescue agencies to remove the pets. For the most part, animals were rescued promptly. More than 250 pets were saved from slow death by Operation LEAD officers.■

The New Jersey Office of Emergency Man­agement, the New Jersey State Police, and all participating local and county members of the police, fire and emergency medical communities would like to express our appreciation and sup­port to the Louisiana State Police and the police departments of New Orleans, Harahan, and Kenner. Operation LEAD is proud to have par­ticipated, along with thousands of other rescue workers from around the country, in helping these fine departments overcome the worst nat­ural tragedy to befall this country. The New Jer­sey Louisiana Emergency Assistance Deploy­ment has now become the New Jersey Law Enforcement Assistance Deployment, a name change that reflects New Jersey's continued readiness and preparedness to respond any­where in the country under EMAC or at the request of the federal emergency manage­ment agencies.

1 The superintendent of state police operates in the dual role of state director of emergency management. Only Michigan has a similar arrangement. During times of crisis, this dual authority overcomes time-consuming decision protocols across agency lines.
2 Two incident commanders represented Opera­tion LEAD over its five-week deployment in New Or­leans: Major John Hunt, commanding officer of the New Jersey State Police Emergency Management Sec­tion (EMS) and deputy state director of the office of emergency management; and Captain Jerome Hat­field, executive officer of the EMS.
3 The second two-week deployment of Operation LEAD occurred on September 17 and 18 and involved 148 police, fire, and emergency medical workers and 25 decontamination specialists. The third, and last, de­ployment left on September 28 and 29 with another 148 personnel and 30 decontamination specialists.
4 The authors would like to thank Dr. Fred Jacobs, commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, and Dr. Cliff Lacey, execu­tive director of the Robert Wood Johnson University Hospital in New Brunswick, for their assistance in providing the required inoculations to Operation LEAD personnel prior to their deployment to Louisiana.

>


Additional photographs taken during the deployment can be found online on the New Jersey State Police Web site, (www.njsp.org), by clicking the Operation LEAD icon.


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From The Police Chief, vol. 73, no. 2, February 2006. Copyright held by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 515 North Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314 USA.








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