Violent crime is spiking across U.S. cities. Recent research documents a 30 percent surge in murders in 2020 and a 16 percent increase for the first half of 2021.1
Nonfatal assaults are rising as well. That said, the United States is not in the grip of a national crime wave, as some suggest. Property and drug crimes have declined in most places, and even homicide rates remain well below historical highs.
While such context is important, it does not mean the recent rise in violence should be minimized. It has already killed or injured thousands, with many more still at risk. Something must be done, and soon.
By all accounts, it is community gun violence—the lethal or potentially lethal gun violence that happens far too often in poor urban communities—that is driving the problem.2 Americans face more than one challenge related to firearms—domestic and mass shootings, as well as gun suicides, are part of the problem—but it is community gun violence that accounts for the vast majority of gun homicides, and the past two years are no exception.
Community gun violence is not a new phenomenon. It has been studied extensively, with literally thousands of scientific articles examining various aspects of the problem. Because of this research, a lot is known about what works—and what doesn’t—when it comes to stopping shootings and saving lives. But translating such know-how into effective, sustained action hasn’t been easy. The Council of Criminal Justice recently established a multidisciplinary Violent Crime Working Group to confront the recent crime spike and provide policy makers with concrete solutions.
One foundational question underlying this work is this: Can police play a constructive role in containing community gun violence? The answer, according to science, is clearly yes. Most researchers give improved policing, particularly innovations like CompStat, some credit for the declines in violent and other crime that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s.3 In New York City where CompStat originated, criminologist Frank Zimring attributes much of the city’s record-breaking success to proactive policing in crime hot spots.4 In addition, economic research suggests that adding more police officers can prevent multiple violent crimes per officer.5
Other policing strategies also have solid track records in reducing violent crime. In systematic reviews of hot spots and problem-oriented policing, researchers examined dozens of rigorous evaluations and found these approaches to be effective.6 Focused deterrence has had the most impact on curbing violent crime to date. It uses community-police partnerships to reduce gun violence among high-risk individuals and groups.7
Can police control community gun violence all by themselves? Equally clearly, the answer is no. First, improved policing gets only partial credit for reducing crime over the past 30 years, as many other factors contributed as well. Further, some criminologists dispute the “more cops, less crime” hypothesis, arguing that the quality of policing matters much more than the quantity.8 Finally, even the most successful policing strategies, when measured carefully, have only modest to moderate effects. So yes, choosing a smart policing strategy will likely reduce violence, but not by as much as one would like.
Even if police could control violence by themselves, they shouldn’t. Most law enforcement strategies work by either deterring or incapacitating criminals via arrest and incarceration—a costly approach not just in budgetary terms, but more importantly, in human terms. These strategies, particularly the most aggressive ones, should be used the way oncologists use radiation therapy: only when necessary and with care taken to minimize any side effects. Leaders in law enforcement must avoid the previous policies of mass arrest and mass incarceration that had devastating impacts on poor communities of color.
Likewise, with certain strategies, police leaders must be cautious about the possibility of misuse. Initially lauded for its successes, the New York Police Department became mired in controversy over “stop and frisk” when that strategy was deployed too broadly, too intensively, and without enough input from community members. Putting “cops on dots” is important, but getting officers to the right places is not enough—they must also do the right things. Overbroad and overly aggressive policing—even when limited to high-crime hot spots—is not particularly effective, triggers community resistance, and has too many collateral consequences.9
“Society must be able to fight violence and promote justice at the same time.”
Here’s another example. While anti-crime street units have had some successes in reducing crime and getting guns off the street, they have also been associated with some of the most notorious police scandals in recent history.10 With Baltimore’s Gun Trace Task Force and Los Angeles’ Rampart CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums) Unit, for instance, officers were given license to aggressively seek out guns and drugs but were eventually charged with numerous civil rights and criminal infractions.11 Without clear guidelines, close supervision, and strict discipline, such units can become liabilities that stain the reputations of entire departments, and even the entire profession.
More broadly, policing also does little, if anything, to address the root causes of crime and violence. Law enforcement cannot fix concentrated poverty and rising inequality, nor can it close gaps in the social safety net. Police can do their best to avoid exacerbating such problems with their own policies, but racial and economic disparities in education, housing, health, and employment are well beyond their reach.
All of this means that when it comes to controlling community gun violence, the science says that policing is necessary but not sufficient. To be successful, police need partners outside law enforcement. Fortunately, there are multiple proven and promising non-enforcement strategies that can complement law enforcement’s efforts in this area. As mentioned previously, focused deterrence is one such strategy. It unites police, community members and service providers behind a strong, consistent message to individuals and groups at the highest risk for gun violence: “We’re here to help you, but if the shootings continue, we’re here to stop you.” Then, police back up that message with concrete action. Focused deterrence has a strong track record, but it occasionally fails, often for relying too heavily on police and tough enforcement. Focused deterrence works best as a truly balanced approach, exemplified in Oakland, California, where the program cut violence roughly in half.12
Another strategy is street outreach, where community members, often formerly incarcerated individuals, serve as conflict mediators to prevent potentially violent conflicts from turning deadly.13 Because outreach workers engage directly with some of the most disconnected members of society, street outreach must be seen as truly independent from law enforcement to gain the trust of these individuals. The effectiveness of street outreach often depends on maintaining clear working relationships between police and outreach workers, even if those relationships are at arm’s length. In Los Angeles, California, where there is a formal structure for coordination put in place by the mayor’s office, outreach workers reduced gang retaliation incidents by approximately 30 percent.14
Other non-enforcement strategies, such as “cleaning and greening” activities in crime hot spots and cognitive behavioral therapy—often combined with subsidized employment—for high-risk individuals, can make important anti-crime contributions as well.15 Police should support these strategies by providing data and other information, coordinating activities, making referrals, and taking other measures. One promising model for such collaboration is third-party policing, where police partner with residents, landlords, business owners, regulators, licensing authorities, and others, encouraging them to use their non-police authority to prevent crime and violence.16
Whatever the strategy, research indicates that police and their partners should stay focused on preventing the worst crimes, by the most dangerous people, in the most dangerous places. It is well understood that crime, particularly violence, concentrates among a surprisingly small set of people and places.17 Maintaining an intense focus on these individuals and locations, both in terms of punishment and support, is a crucial ingredient for success—and can help avoid the mistakes of the past.
An emphasis on fairness and legitimacy is also essential. To be successful, especially over time, police must be perceived as good partners—willing and able to work with others to keep communities safe. A growing body of evidence suggests that when police improve the fairness of their internal and external processes, they can build legitimacy and ultimately increase compliance with the law.18 Police anti-violence efforts should use procedural justice to convince partners and the public alike that they will operate in an unbiased and impartial manner.19
Here is another important point, one that is often overlooked: Maintaining strong community relationships is essential for effective law enforcement. Too often such efforts are regarded as “PR” and not “real” police work. However, as any good homicide detective knows, the reality is exactly the opposite—without strong relationships, you cannot get information, and without information you cannot close cases. Positive police-community relationships are the lifeblood of effective law enforcement.
Data suggest that work on this piece of the puzzle must be more diligent than ever. The national clearance rate for homicides has declined from 79 percent in 1976 to 61 percent in 2019, with a further decline expected for 2020. The rate for nonfatal shootings is far lower. Improving relationships with community members, particularly those closest to the violence, can persuade more people to come forward with information concerning open crimes, particularly murders. In addition, new evidence suggests that enhanced investigative resources, improved management structures, and stronger oversight processes can make a real difference.20
Improving clearance rates can prevent further violence in at least three ways. If more shooters are apprehended, others may think twice before pulling the trigger. Second, if killers are caught the first time, they cannot kill again as long as they remain in prison. Third, bringing murderers to justice eliminates the need and opportunity for others to take revenge, thereby interrupting potential cycles of retaliation. It is crucial that even as police establish innovative new partnerships to reduce community gun violence, law enforcement does not overlook the traditional responsibility for apprehending those who commit serious crimes of violence.
Finally, police leaders must recognize that perhaps one of the most important ways to reduce gun violence in a community is to prevent unlawful or excessive force from being used against that community. In the weeks immediately after George Floyd was murdered in Minneapolis, Minnesota, violence skyrocketed around the United States in poor densely populated urban areas. In the months after Michael Brown was killed by police in Ferguson, a wave of violence washed over the nation. A single incident can put a whole department, or even the entire profession, under intense and unrelenting pressure. It is not clear exactly why such incidents trigger broad-based increases in violence. De-policing and delegitimization are two credible theories, but it should be obvious by now that community gun violence flourishes in the aftermath of controversial police shootings.21
The Council on Criminal Justice recently convened a Task Force on Policing to identify the policies and practices that are most likely to reduce violent encounters between officers and the public. The task force found many misconceptions and no easy answers.22 But carefully implemented reforms like de-escalation training can produce progress when adopted alongside other policies.23 Most important, the false choice between safety and reform must be rejected. Both are necessary, and the two complement each other. Society must be able to fight violence and promote justice at the same time.
In conclusion, today’s politicians and policy makers should look to the science and reject the polarizing rhetoric declared so often today. To reduce community gun violence, communities need police, but not just the police. Communities must come together with police as well, along with a strong supporting cast of others. Calls to “defund” must be denied and replaced with more reasonable demands to ensure that efforts to promote public safety are focused, balanced, and fair.24 The world needs less arguing and more problem-solving.
Notes:
1Richard Rosenfeld, Thomas Abt, and Ernesto Lopez, Pandemic, Social Unrest, and Crime in U.S. Cities: 2020 Year-End Update (Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, January 2021); Richard Rosenfeld and Ernesto Lopez, Pandemic, Social Unrest, and Crime in U.S. Cities: June 2021 Update (Washington, DC: Council on Criminal Justice, July 2021).
2Council on Criminal Justice, “Meeting Bulletin #2: Crime Trends in Context,” Violent Crime Working Group (blog), August 16, 2021.
3Oliver Roeder, Lauren-Brooke Eisen, and Julia Bowling, What Caused the Crime Decline? (New York, NY: Brennan Center for Justice, 2015).
4Franklin E. Zimring, “How New York City Beat Crime,” Scientific American 305, no. 2 (August 2011).
5Steven D. Levitt, “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime,” The American Economic Review 87, no. 3 (June 1997): 270–290; Steven Mello, “More COPS, Less Crime,” Journal of Public Economics 172 (April 2019): 174–200.
6Anthony A. Braga et al., “Hot Spots Policing and Crime Reduction: An Update of an Ongoing Systematic Review and Meta-analysis,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 15, (2019): 289–311; Joshua C. Hinkle et al., “Problem-Oriented Policing for Reducing Crime and Disorder: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-analysis” Campbell Systematic Reviews 16, no. 2 (June 2020): e1089.
7Anthony A. Braga, David Weisburd, and Brandon Turchan, “Focused Deterrence Strategies and Crime Control: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of the Empirical Evidence,” Criminology & Public Policy 17, no. 1 (February 2018): 205–250.
8Tomislav V. Kovandzic et al., “Police, Crime and the Problem of Weak Instruments: Revisiting the ‘More Police, Less Crime’ Thesis,” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 32, no. 1 (March 2016): 133–158; YongJei Lee, John E. Eck, and Nicholas Corsaro, “Conclusions from the History of Research into the Effects of Police Force Size on Crime—1968 through 2013: A Historical Systematic Review,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 12, no. 3 (September 2016): 431–451.
9National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime and Communities (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2018).
10Christopher S. Koper and Evan Mayo-Wilson, “Police Strategies to Reduce Illegal Possession and Carrying of Firearms: Effects on Gun Crime,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 8, no. 1 (2012): 1–53.
11Daniel W. Webster et al., Reducing Violence and Building Trust: Data to Guide Enforcement of Gun Laws in Baltimore (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Center for Gun Violence Prevention and Policy, 2020); Bernard C. Parks, Board of Inquiry into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident, public report (Los Angeles, CA: Los Angeles Police Department, 2000).
12Mike McLively and Brittany Nieto, A Case Study in Hope: Lessons from Oakland’s Remarkable Reduction in Gun Violence (San Francisco, CA: Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 2019).
13John Jay College Research Advisory Group on Preventing and Reducing Community Violence, Reducing Violence Without Police: A Review of Research Evidence (New York, NY: Research and Evaluation Center, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York, 2020).
14P. Jeffery Brantingham et al., GRYD Intervention Incident Response & Gang Crime: 2017 Evaluation Report (Los Angeles, CA: California State University, 2017)
15John Jay College Research Advisory Group on Preventing and Reducing Community Violence, Reducing Violence Without Police; Mark Lipsey, Nana A. Landenberger, and Sandra Jo Wilson, “Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Programs for Criminal Offenders,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 3, no. 1 (2007): 1–27.
16Janet Ransley, “Third Party Policing,” Oxford Bibliographies, May 29, 2019.
17Stephen Lurie, Alexis Acevedo, and Kyle Ott “The Less Than 1%: Groups and the Extreme Concentration of Urban Violence” (presentation, American Society of Criminology 74th Annual Meeting, Atlanta, GA, November 14, 2018); David Weisburd, “The Law of Crime Concentration and the Criminology of Place,” Criminology 53, no.2 (May 2015): 133–157.
18Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) Task Force on Policing, “Procedural Justice Training,” policy assessment, March 2021.
19The Justice Collaboratory, Yale Law School, “Procedural Justice.”
20Anthony A. Braga, Improving Police Clearance Rates of Shootings: A Review of the Evidence (New York, NY: Manhattan Institute, 2021).
21Paul G. Cassell, “Explaining the Recent Homicide Spikes in U.S. Cities: The ‘Minneapolis Effect’ and the Decline in Proactive Policing,” Federal Sentencing Reporter 33, no. 1–2(2020): 83–127; David M. Kennedy, State Violence, Legitimacy, and the Path to True Public Safety (Washington, D.C.: Niskanen Center, 2020).
22Nancy La Vigne, “Five Misconceptions About Police Reform,” The Crime Report, August 13, 2021.
23Council on Criminal Justice Task Force on Policing, “De-escalation Policies and Training,” policy assessment, March 2021.
24Thomas Abt, Bleeding Out: The Devastating Consequences of Urban Violence—and a Bold New Plan for Peace in the Streets (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2019).
Please cite as
Thomas Abt, “Necessary but Not Sufficient: The Police Role in Reducing Violence,” Police Chief 88, no. 11 (November 2021): 28–31.
